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 RESOURCE COMMITMENT, ENTRY TIMING, AND MARKET
 PERFORMANCE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN
 EMERGING ECONOMIES: THE CASE OF JAPANESE
 INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES IN CHINA
 TAKEHIKO ISOBE
 University of Marketing and Distribution Sciences
 SHIGE MAKINO
 Chinese University of Hong Kong
 DAVID B. MONTGOMERY
 Stanford University
 This study examined whether early movers and technology leaders attained superior
 performance in emerging economic regions. We assessed the determinants and perfor-
 mance consequences of two key aspects of entry strategy, resource commitment to
 technology transfer and timing of entry, using survey data from over 220 Sino-Japanese
 joint ventures (JVs) in China. Both high commitment and early entry had positive
 impacts on the perceived economic performance of the JVs. Yet these relationships
 were found to be significantly contingent on several internal and external factors, such
 as the strategic importance of an investment, parental control of a JV, and the avail-
 ability of supporting local infrastructure.
 Emerging economic regions have been playing a
 critical role in global economies. Since their market
 liberalization and privatization policies were for-
 mally set forth, these areas have attracted many
 foreign investors (United Nations Conference on
 Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 1997). The
 successful entry and start-up of a business opera-
 tion in these regions is therefore a central issue for
 contemporary multinational enterprises (MNEs).
 Nonetheless, some managers of foreign multina-
 tionals may see more uncertainty than opportunity
 in emerging economies with respect to local de-
 mand conditions, the availability of supporting in-
 dustries and infrastructure, property rights protec-
 tion, and general economic and political stability.
 Given the contradictory implications regarding po-
 tential opportunities and uncertainties in the
 emerging economic regions, managers of foreign
 multinationals are facing a dilemma. Two issues
 We wish to thank Lorraine Eden, Hideki Yoshihara,
 Paul W. Beamish, Michael Young, and three anony-
 mous reviewers for comments on drafts of this article.
 The work described in this article was partially sup-
 ported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of
 the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Project
 No. CUHK4093/98H). The first author acknowledges
 the financial support of the University of Marketing
 and Distribution Sciences, Kobe, Japan.
 are critical: One, should a firm be the early mover
 and explore potential market opportunities before
 competitors enter these markets, or should it be a
 late entrant and wait until the uncertainties in the
 regions are resolved by earlier entrants? Two,
 should a firm be a technology leader and transfer
 advanced, core technology or skills to the emerging
 economic regions, or should it should be a technol-
 ogy follower and invest standard, less critical tech-
 nology or skills in these regions?
 The first issue involves the timing of entry and
 the second, the degree of resource commitment to
 technology transfer. Most previous studies have ex-
 amined the determinants and performance of the
 timing and resource commitment of entry in a do-
 mestic context. Of the studies that have examined
 these issues in an international context, most have
 focused on either North American multinationals
 entering foreign countries or foreign firms investing
 in North America (Mascarenhas, 1992b, 1997;
 Mitchell, Shaver, & Yeung, 1994; Shaver, Mitchell,
 & Yeung, 1997). Few studies have provided empir-
 ical evidence or explored the implications concern-
 ing the issues associated with both determinants
 and performance of entry strategy in international
 markets (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998). The pri-
 mary purpose of the present study was, therefore,
 to fill this gap by examining factors influencing
 firms' decisions to enter emerging economic re-
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 gions and the performance consequences of such
 entry.
 We examined several hypotheses regarding the
 determinants and performance of both the commit-
 ment to technology transfer and the timing of entry.
 The sample used in the analysis comprised 220
 joint ventures (JVs) formed by Japanese manufac-
 turing firms in the People's Republic of China
 (hereafter, China). In the present study, we focused
 exclusively on the equity JV in the analysis because
 it has been a dominant and often a "forced" entry
 mode in most emerging regions (Beamish, 1985,
 1993). We chose China as the location of invest-
 ment for the analysis. With its relatively short his-
 tory of an open economic policy and the large
 amount of inward investment made by foreign mul-
 tinationals, we believe that China provides a good
 research environment for investigating the rela-
 tively early stage of the process of inward foreign
 direct investment (FDI) made by foreign multina-
 tionals. Few studies have examined the relation-
 ships to performance of the timing of foreign mar-
 ket entry and resource commitment to technology
 transfer in China simultaneously, although the lit-
 erature on FDI in China and on Chinese enterprises
 has been rapidly increasing. The present study
 therefore provides new insight on the performance
 of FDI in emerging regions in general and in China
 in particular.
 LITERATURE REVIEW
 Resource Commitment, Entry Timing, and
 Market Performance
 To attain superior profits in an overseas market, a
 firm should successfully commercialize goods in
 the local marketplace. For the successful commer-
 cialization of the goods, the firm can consider two
 alternative strategies. The first strategy is to transfer
 superior technological knowledge and build tech-
 nology leadership in the host country.
 Technology, or technological knowledge, is gener-
 ally defined as "knowledge about how to produce a
 cheaper or better product at given input prices, or
 how to produce a given product at a lower cost than
 competing firms" (Caves, 1996: 3). Such knowledge
 takes the forms of patented design and process, or of
 know-how shared among the employees of a firm
 (Caves, 1996). Technological knowledge is one form
 of intangible asset that can serve as a source of com-
 petitive advantage when it is valuable, nonimitable,
 and nonsubstitutable (Barney, 1991). Since a new
 technology often creates a new product yet diffuses
 slowly to competitors, the pioneer of the technology
 are often bound by existing routines and sunk costs
 and remain committed to outmoded technology (Lev-
 itt & March, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Tushman &
 Anderson, 1986). When a firm can exploit technolog-
 ical knowledge across borders without losing its
 value, and the advantages generated by this knowl-
 edge outweigh its liabilities of foreignness, the firm
 can build a strong competitive position in a local
 marketplace (Caves, 1971; Hymer, 1976). Previous
 studies have suggested that, when engaging in FDI,
 firms tend to transfer technology that is newer, more
 advanced, and more related to their core businesses
 (Chang, 1995; Davidson & McFetridge, 1985; Kogut &
 Chang, 1996). Other studies have suggested a positive
 association between a parent firm's research and de-
 velopment expenditure (used as proxy for technology
 leadership) and both its level of multinationality
 (Dunning, 1980) and the market value of a given
 foreign subsidiary (Mishra & Gobeli, 1998; Morck &
 Yeung, 1992). These studies suggest that strong com-
 mitment to technology transfer leads to superior sub-
 sidiary performance in the local market.
 Transfer of technology is, however, neither easy
 nor automatic. In his study of 26 international tech-
 nology transfer projects, Teece (1977) found that
 transfer costs accounted for 19 percent of total
 project costs on the average, ranging from 2 percent
 to 59 percent; these numbers suggest that technol-
 ogy transfer does incur nontrivial costs. Similarly,
 Kogut and Zander (1992, 1993) suggested that the
 efficiency of knowledge transfer within an organi-
 zation varied depending on the tacitness of the
 knowledge. On a different note, some studies have
 explored the factors that constrain knowledge
 transfer. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argued that
 the successful diffusion of innovative knowledge
 requires recipients to have a high degree of absorp-
 tive capacity-the capability to acquire, assimilate,
 and exploit information regarding appropriate in-
 novation. Szulanski (1996) examined 122 transfers
 of best practices in eight large companies and
 found that the internal transfer of knowledge was
 significantly constrained by a recipient's lack of
 absorptive capacity, causal ambiguity, and an "ar-
 duous" relationship between a source and recipi-
 ent. In the context of knowledge transfer across
 borders, Lyles and Salk (1996) studied 201 interna-
 tional JVs in Hungary and found that their capacity
 to learn was a significant indicator of knowledge
 acquisition from the foreign parents.
 It should also be noted that technology transfer
 influences subsidiary performance not only be-
 cause a transfer is difficult or costly but also be-
 cause the transferred technology may not always be
 successfully commercialized in local marketplaces
 can gain market share. This is because competitors
 2000  469
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 for example, suggested that the level of technology
 appropriability, the existence of a dominant design
 in an industry, and the presence of complementary
 assets were critical conditions for successful com-
 mercialization of technology. Building on Teece's
 finding, Mitchell (1989, 1991) found evidence that
 market entrants possessing the specialized assets
 necessary for the commercialization of products
 tended to attain higher market shares in new indus-
 try subfields. These studies suggest that a firm's
 capability to integrate technology into the systems
 of local production and commercialization is criti-
 cal for the commercial success of a foreign market
 entry. The transfer of this type of capability is es-
 pecially important when a firm enters an emerging
 economic region, where established distribution
 networks and technical specifications and designs
 rarely exist (Yan, 1998).
 Both the capability to transfer technological knowl-
 edge into a new local marketplace and the capability
 to profit from the commercialization of the trans-
 ferred technology are highly specific to and owned by
 particular individuals within a firm. Technology
 transfer, therefore, often occurs through the expatria-
 tion of specialized technical staff members who share
 both the knowledge of the technology and the know-
 how needed to apply it to commercial ends. This
 specialized technical staff is more critical for the com-
 mercial success of an entry when the technology is
 highly tacit and/or its commercial application is dif-
 ficult and complex (Hamel, 1991; Lyles & Salk, 1996).
 Taken together, these arguments suggest that a
 firm's performance in a new foreign market is a
 function of both the uniqueness of the technology
 being transferred and the presence of a specialized
 technical staff that can convey the tacit aspects of
 the technology and commercialize it in the local
 marketplace. On this basis, we suggest that a firm's
 commitment to technology transfer is positively
 associated with its foreign market performance.
 Thus,
 Hypothesis 1. There exists a positive relation-
 ship between a foreign firm's level of commit-
 ment to technology transfer and its local mar-
 ket performance.
 The second strategy is to enter a local marketplace
 faster than rivals. An early mover, by definition, has a
 quasi monopoly before competition enters and is in a
 position to capture higher economic rents than would
 be possible in a competitive marketplace (von Hippel,
 1988: 59). After entry, the early mover may gain or
 maintain advantages by preempting rivals in "riding
 down learning curves," acquiring scarce assets like
 locally available input factors and geographic space
 man & Montgomery, 1988). Early movers can also
 gain profits by influencing customers' attitudes and
 perceptions. According to Lieberman and Montgom-
 ery (1998), this can occur in three major ways. First,
 customers may build a preference structure that fa-
 vors the pioneer's position as they learn about its
 brands (Carpenter & Nakamoto, 1989). Second, cus-
 tomers may develop switching costs that create bar-
 riers to late movers. Finally, customers may favor the
 early mover's product when it becomes the industry
 standard or dominant industrial design and thus al-
 lows compatibility with the largest base of external
 users (Tegarden, Hatfield, & Echols, 1999). Early mov-
 ers, however, are also subject to certain disadvan-
 tages. Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) suggested
 that late entrants can gain advantages over an early
 mover when they possess capabilities to acquire the
 same technology at a lower cost, use superior tech-
 nology to produce better or cheaper products, capture
 shifts in consumers' tastes more quickly, and make
 more intensive investments than early movers.
 Empirical evidence from the studies of United
 States-based domestic market entry strategies has
 generally suggested that early movers tend to attain
 market performance that is superior to late entrants'
 (see Kerin, Varadarajan, and Peterson [1992], Lieber-
 man and Montgomery [1998], and Szymanski, Troy,
 and Bharadwaj [1995] for reviews). For instance, Szy-
 manski and colleagues reviewed empirical studies
 and found that approximately 70 percent of them
 reported positive effects of order of entry on market
 share.
 However, several researchers have argued that
 entry order effects are significantly moderated by
 factors such as survivor bias and entrant capabili-
 ties. Golder and Tellis (1993) criticized the previ-
 ous studies for excluding nonsurvivors from their
 analyses. In their study of 50 product categories,
 they found that nearly half of the market pioneers
 failed and that the early followers had much lower
 failure rates and higher market shares than the pi-
 oneers. Examining both the surviving and failed
 entrants simultaneously, Mitchell (1991) found
 that the early entrants tended to attain higher mar-
 ket shares yet had lower survival likelihoods than
 the late entrants, suggesting a trade-off between
 market share and survival affected the timing of
 entry.
 With regard to entrant capacity, Mitchell (1991)
 found that industry incumbents (the entrants that
 possessed industry-specialized assets such as dis-
 tribution networks) attained higher market shares
 than industry newcomers (entrants lacking such
 assets), irrespective of the order of entry. Yet Mitch-
 ell did find that, among the industry incumbents,
 and developing a unique local buyer network (Lieber-
 470  June
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 better market share performance. The cited studies
 generally suggest that early mover effects on market
 performance might be better specified as interac-
 tions than as direct effects (Lieberman & Montgom-
 ery, 1998; Szymanski et al., 1995).
 In an international market context, studies sug-
 gest that early movers tend to have relatively high
 failure rates compared to early followers because
 the latter benefit from the experience of the former
 (Mitchell et al., 1994; Shaver et al., 1997; Yan,
 1998). With regard to market performance, previ-
 ous studies have shown strong evidence of the ex-
 istence of early mover effects. Mascarenhas (1992a,
 1992b, 1997) studied entry strategies in the inter-
 national offshore drilling industry and found that
 early movers attained significantly higher market
 shares than late movers. He found this result con-
 sistently even after controlling for the size of a
 firm's initial resource commitment upon entry
 (Mascarenhas, 1997). Recent studies of entry strat-
 egies in China have shown even stronger and more
 consistent evidence of early mover advantages
 among foreign entrants. These studies showed that
 early entrants (foreign investors) in China attained
 higher performance in profitability, sales growth,
 and local competitive position, suggesting that
 there are noticeable early mover advantages in an
 emerging economic region (Luo, 1998; Luo & Peng,
 1998; Pan & Chi, 1999; Pan, Li, & Tse, 1999).
 Several possible factors may allow early movers
 to gain superior market performance in emerging
 economic regions. First, an early entrant may face
 less competition, which makes it easy for it to de-
 velop a monopoly in the local markets. In emerging
 regions, most local incumbents lack the strong ca-
 pabilities and resources necessary to compete di-
 rectly with foreign entrants.1 Also, potential foreign
 entrants tend to adopt a wait-and-see strategy be-
 cause there is a high degree of uncertainty in the
 local markets. Second, early entrants may establish
 brand loyalty more easily than late entrants in
 emerging economic regions, where dominant
 brands and design are absent. Finally, local govern-
 ments in these regions often treat early foreign en-
 1 Researchers (Lecraw, 1983, 1993; Wells, 1981, 1983),
 have suggested that the firms in emerging economic re-
 gions typically engage in small-scale, labor-intensive
 production development and processes, whereas foreign
 multinationals engage in large-scale, capital-intensive
 production. The different capabilities of local incum-
 bents and foreign entrants often constitute the basis of
 division of labor in competition in emerging economic
 trants more favorably.2 Where such differential
 government treatment is critical for success, foreign
 firms may have motivation to move sooner rather
 than later.
 Taking these arguments together, we expected
 that early movers, if they survived, would have
 better performance on the average than late en-
 trants:
 Hypothesis 2. There exists a positive relation-
 ship between early entry and market perfor-
 mance in an emerging economic region.
 Influences on Resource Commitment and Timing
 of Entry
 Emerging economic regions are generally charac-
 terized by relatively high market growth rates, short
 histories of economic liberalization, and a lack of
 established institutional systems that support do-
 mestic business activities. Khanna and Palepu
 (1997) suggested that the institutional context in an
 emerging economic region is typically character-
 ized by underdeveloped capital markets, scarcity of
 skilled labor, lack of reliable market information,
 extensive state intervention for business opera-
 tions, and lack of effective mechanisms to enforce
 contracts. Such "institutional voids" make market
 transactions in these regions less efficient and,
 from an investor's perspective, create significant
 uncertainty.
 Since the presence of uncertainty raises the level
 of the financial risk managers perceive in invest-
 ment, rational managers may value the options of
 transferring less proprietary (more standard) tech-
 nical know-how and delaying entry, especially
 when an investment would be irreversible and the
 difficulty of selling off the invested assets would be
 high (Rivoli & Salorio, 1996). However, a financial
 investment risk is only one consideration. Given a
 high growth rate and lack of established competi-
 tors in an emerging region, some managers may
 consider that the strategic risks of not investing
 there may be, at least in the long term, more critical
 than the financial risks of investing in the region.
 Actual entry decisions therefore should be consid-
 ered in terms of managers' view of the relative
 significance of both types of risks. In this study, we
 specifically focused on three factors that would
 influence managers' attitudes toward these risks
 2 In China, for example, there is a saying that "old
 friends are welcome," meaning that the local government
 would appreciate early entrants' initial goodwill and
 treat them more favorably than late foreign entrants
 regions, reducing rivalry in these regions (Kumar, 1981).
 471 2000
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 and, hence, their firms' entry decisions. These fac-
 tors were the strategic importance of investment,
 parental control over local operations, and support-
 ing infrastructure.
 Strategic importance. An investment in a par-
 ticular local market is considered strategically im-
 portant when it is consonant with the primary fo-
 cus and function of a firm's global strategy. Many
 multinational enterprises develop complex net-
 works of production and distribution systems
 around the world whereby exchanges of resources
 and skills and collective learning take place be-
 tween headquarters and subsidiaries and among
 subsidiaries (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990). For the suc-
 cessful implementation of global strategy, an MNE
 should carefully implement its entry strategy for
 each separate international market because the fail-
 ure or success of the investment in one market will
 critically influence other activities within the net-
 work. Therefore, when investment in a particular
 local market is important to a firm's global strategy,
 the firm will become less averse to the financial
 risks of investment and more aware of the impor-
 tance of developing a strong market position in the
 target local market through an aggressive entry
 strategy. We therefore expected that, as the impor-
 tance of an investment increases, the investing firm
 will transfer more advanced, core technology to its
 local subsidiaries and enter the target local market
 faster than its rivals. The following hypotheses
 were formulated:
 Hypothesis 3. There exists a positive relation-
 ship between a joint venture's degree of strate-
 gic importance and a foreign firm's level of
 commitment to technology transfer.
 Hypothesis 4. There exists a positive relation-
 ship between a joint venture's degree of strate-
 gic importance and early entry.
 Parental control. In the process of technology
 transfer, a foreign firm may face the risks of leakage
 of its proprietary technology and know-how to an
 alliance partner. Interfirm spillovers of proprietary
 technology occur because alliance partners often
 have an incentive to acquire each other's core tech-
 nology or skills (Hamel, 1991). For this reason,
 alliance partners are viewed as potential competi-
 tors, although they are at the same time collaborat-
 ing on some common or complementary functional
 activities (Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989). Several
 researchers have investigated factors that would
 affect the competitive and cooperative behaviors of
 alliance partners and have examined how these
 behaviors would influence the success of the stra-
 suggested that the competitive aspects of alliances
 are most severe when a firm's ratio of "private" to
 "common" benefits is high. Park and Russo (1996)
 found that the presence of competition between
 joint venture partners outside their agreement sig-
 nificantly impaired the survival likelihood of the
 joint ventures.
 To safeguard against potential interfirm spillover
 problems, alliance partners should either specify in
 alliance agreements each partner's obligatory du-
 ties regarding joint outcomes or should create in-
 centives for both partners to work primarily for
 common benefit and secondarily for private bene-
 fit. Such incentives create a situation in which both
 partners gain or lose together from the performance
 of the alliance (Kogut, 1988). However, such incen-
 tives may not be easily created and shared by alli-
 ance partners when they have different interests in
 or payoff expectations for an alliance (Khanna et
 al., 1998).
 In emerging economic regions, foreign and local
 partners have quite different interests in and expec-
 tations for alliances (Beamish, 1985). Typically,
 foreign partners bring advanced technology and ex-
 pertise to alliances and try to appropriate maxi-
 mum earnings by exploiting the transferred tech-
 nology in the local marketplaces. Local partners, in
 contrast, try to access or acquire this technology
 and may seek the opportunity to use it for other
 product or geographic markets. The existence of
 such asymmetric interests and expectations often
 promotes opportunistic behaviors by a local part-
 ner (free riding) and provides a strong incentive for
 a foreign partner to seek control over an alliance's
 operations (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). A foreign
 firm's need for control is particularly critical in
 emerging economic regions where effective sys-
 tems for the protection of property rights hardly
 exist. In other words, we expected that, where a
 foreign partner can maintain relatively strong con-
 trol over an alliance, it may make a stronger com-
 mitment to the transfer of updated technology and
 specialized technical staff to the alliance.
 Hypothesis 5. There exists a positive relation-
 ship between the degree of a foreign parent's
 control over a joint venture and its level of
 commitment to technology transfer.
 Foreign firms are usually at a disadvantage com-
 pared to local competitors with regard to access to
 location-specific information and resources (Caves,
 1971; Hymer, 1976). Previous studies have sug-
 gested that one of the primary reasons for foreign
 firms to engage in JV formation with local partners
 is to gain quick access to a local market (Beamish,
 tegic alliances. Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria (1998)
 472  June
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 pen and Beamish (1997) suggested that a local JV
 partner will possess greater bargaining power over
 and be less dependent on its foreign JV partner
 when the foreign partner possesses little knowl-
 edge of local market conditions. In support of this
 view, Makino and Delios (1996) found that the
 presence of local JV partners had a significant and
 positive impact on the financial performance of a
 JV when the parent firm had limited experience of
 the local operation. These findings generally imply
 that foreign firms tend to allow their local JV part-
 ners to keep a high level of control within the
 ventures when they are keen to enter unfamiliar
 local markets. This is the case especially when the
 firms invest in emerging economic regions in
 which they can rarely access reliable market infor-
 mation. Therefore:
 Hypothesis 6. There exists a negative relation-
 ship between the degree of a foreign firm's
 control over a joint venture and early entry.
 Supporting infrastructure. Cross-border transfer
 of technology is considered a means to build com-
 petitive advantage in a host country through its
 commercial application. Whether a technology
 transfer is successful depends in part on the avail-
 ability of supporting local infrastructure. There are
 three types of such infrastructure. The first type
 involves complementary or "co-specialized" assets
 (Teece, 1986). These assets typically involve down-
 stream activities of production, such as a distribu-
 tion network. A local distribution network is
 needed to allow a firm to capitalize on proprietary
 technology for commercial application in the local
 market. The second type of infrastructure involves
 local human capital. Local managers and operating
 staff generally possess better access to local infor-
 mation than foreign expatriates and work primarily
 to facilitate the smooth introduction of products or
 services in the local marketplace. The final type of
 infrastructure involves the legal systems that guar-
 antee the protection of intellectual property in a
 host country. The existence of reliable legal sys-
 tems is a critical safeguard against the illegal use or
 application of patented technology and copyrights
 by local imitators in emerging economic regions.
 The lack of these types of infrastructure creates
 uncertainties with regard to the effectiveness of
 cross-border technology transfers. Where the effec-
 tiveness of a technology transfer is unknown, the
 investing firms may become more averse to the
 financial risks of investment. Consequently, they
 are more likely to reduce their levels of commit-
 ment to technology transfer and delay entry, unless
 they are well equipped to wait for the resolution of
 Hypothesis 7. There exists a positive relation-
 ship between the availability of supporting lo-
 cal infrastructure and a foreign firm's level of
 commitment to technology transfer.
 Hypothesis 8. There exists a positive relation-
 ship between the availability of supporting lo-
 cal infrastructure and early entry.
 Other Relationships Examined in the Model
 Most previous studies have used financial per-
 formance to define JV performance. However, using
 a single financial measure may be misleading as it
 cannot account for the diverse objectives or needs
 of all partners in a JV (Anderson, 1990; Hamel et al.,
 1989). Since a JV is formed by two or more firms
 that usually have different objectives, interests, and
 transfer pricing policies, its financial performance
 is not an adequate measure of how well the parent
 firm's primary objective is attained (Gulati, 1998).
 Indeed, a JV partner may perceive a venture as
 making satisfactory progress toward longer-term
 goals or nonfinancial goals, even if its current fi-
 nancial performance is not great (Anderson, 1990;
 Geringer & Hebert, 1991). For this reason, many
 researchers have recommended the use of a partner
 satisfaction measure to assess overall JV perfor-
 mance. In the present study, we used three differ-
 ent performance measures: perceived economic
 performance, employee retention likelihood, and
 overall satisfaction. We assumed that these perfor-
 mance measures were related hierarchically. Spe-
 cifically, we assumed (1) that the extent of em-
 ployee retention represents the level of employee
 satisfaction and motivation and has a positive im-
 pact on both perceived economic performance and
 overall satisfaction and (2) that perceived economic
 performance is positively associated with overall
 satisfaction.
 We also examined the direct relationships be-
 tween three exogenous factors (strategic impor-
 tance, control, and infrastructure) and two of the
 performance measures (financial performance and
 employee retention rate) to control for the possibly
 confounding effects of these factors on perfor-
 mance.
 METHODS
 Sample
 This research is based upon a questionnaire sur-
 vey, 1,723 copies of which were distributed in Au-
 gust 1996 to Chinese executives of Japanese manu-
 facturing subsidiaries in Shanghai, Hangzhou,
 uncertainty. This discussion leads to the following:
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 dents were CEOs or presidents. The sampling frame
 was obtained from Japanese Business in China
 (Mitsubishi Research Institute, 1995). The cover
 letter and questionnaire were written in Chinese.
 The sample was restricted to Chinese executives
 because many of the Japanese subsidiaries did not
 have Japanese managers. To avoid a possible re-
 spondent bias stemming from the respondents'
 country of origin, we decided to focus exclusively
 on the Chinese managers.
 We received 248 responses from 1,723 mailed
 questionnaires, of which 220 were usable. The rest
 of the questionnaires were either not returned, re-
 turned undelivered, or returned with incomplete
 information. A response rate of 14.4 percent seems
 to be low, yet is comparable to that for a recent
 survey distributed to American general managers of
 U.S.-Chinese JVs in China (14.6%; Ding, 1997).
 We examined the potential response bias stem-
 ming from the exclusive use of a sample of Chinese
 managers using 43 subsidiaries in our sample that
 are also reported in the database Kaigai Shinshutsu
 Kigyo Soran (Toyo Keizai, 1997).3 We examined
 whether the profitability item reported by Chinese
 managers in our study (variable y4 in Table 1, mea-
 sured on a five-point Likert scale) was significantly
 correlated with the performance of the same sub-
 sidiaries reported by Japanese managers in the
 Toyo Keizai database (on a three-point scale rated
 negative, -1; even, 0; and positive, 1). Spearman
 correlational analysis showed that there was a sig-
 nificant correlation between both performance
 measures (r = .55, p < .01), suggesting that there
 might be little difference between the Chinese and
 Japanese responses.
 We examined nonrespondent bias using 138 joint
 venture cases listed in the Toyo Keizai database. Of
 138 cases, 43 were respondents for our survey, and
 95 were nonrespondents. We compared four items
 of subsidiary information reported in the data-
 base-performance, Japanese equity ownership
 (percentage), subsidiary size (total number of em-
 ployees), and subsidiary age (number of years since
 foundation)-between respondents and nonre-
 spondents. The results of t-tests indicated that
 there were no statistically significant differences
 between respondents and nonrespondents on any
 of the subsidiary information. This evidence indi-
 cates that there was no important nonrespondent
 bias in our sample.
 Since we obtained all data from a single source
 instrument (the self-report questionnaire), our data
 3 See Beamish, Delios, and Lecraw (1997) for the de-
 may suffer from common method variance. Follow-
 ing Podsakoff and Organ (1986), we used the Har-
 man one-factor test to examine the extent of com-
 mon method variance in our data. A principal
 components factor analysis with an unrotated so-
 lution indicated 14 factors with eigenvalues greater
 than 1.0, with the largest variance explained by a
 single factor being 20.5 percent. The result suggests
 that no single factor accounted for the majority of
 the covariance in the variables. From this evidence,
 we inferred that no substantial amount of common
 method variance was present in our data set.
 We also examined possible parent firm effects on
 JV performance because previous research has sug-
 gested that parent firm attributes might play a crit-
 ical role in determining the success of an alliance
 (e.g., Hamel, 1991; Khanna et al., 1998; Larson,
 1992; Parkhe, 1993; Shan, Walker, & Kogut, 1994).
 We used four parent firm variables-sales, return
 on sales, the R&D-to-sales ratio, and the advertis-
 ing-to-sales ratio-and examined their association
 with the profitability item (y4) in our dataset. Pear-
 son's correlational analysis yielded no significant
 associations between the parent firm variables and
 the profitability item at the .10 level. This evidence
 implies no likely critical parent firm effects on JV
 performance.
 Variables
 The overall measurement model employs 16
 items to measure the three exogenous and five en-
 dogenous constructs. The constructs are repre-
 sented by five variables. Three capture exogenous
 constructs: the strategic importance of a JV to the
 Japanese parent (importance), the extent of a Japa-
 nese parent's control within a JV (control), and the
 availability of supporting infrastructure in local
 markets (infrastructure). The endogenous con-
 structs are represented by two variables that are
 related to technology transfer. These variables are
 the degree of resource commitment to technology
 transfer (technology) and the timing of entry (tim-
 ing).4 We also used three general performance vari-
 ables, employee retention rate (retention), per-
 4 An anonymous reviewer suggested that we should
 control for firm size as this variable might affect the
 magnitude of a parent firm's technology transfer. Re-
 sponding to this suggestion, we examined whether par-
 ent firm size was significantly associated with the tech-
 nology variable, using Pearson's correlational analysis.
 The result showed no significant association between the
 two variables (r = .03, p = .85), indicating no critical firm
 tails of this database.
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 TABLE 1
 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
 Variable Mean s.d. xl x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 yl y2 y3 y4 y5 y6
 xl Role 3.83 1.14
 x2 Definition 4.45 0.98 .56**
 x3 Post 3.53 1.56 .33** .27**
 x4 Equity 31.73 22.88 -.26** -.25** -.39**
 x5 Chairman 0.37 0.48 -.30** -.17** -.76** .47**
 x6 Protection 3.99 1.10 .02 .21 -.01 .09 .02
 x7 Recruit 3.09 1.27 -.04 .00 -.13* .04 .09 .46**
 x8 Distribution 3.45 1.20 -.03 .12 .05 .02 -.09 .45** .41**
 yl Technology 3.51 1.26 .49** .59** .26** -.27** -.32** .03 .03 .05
 y2 Engineer 3.64 1.35 .32** .42** .42** -.20** -.31** .18** .03 .01 .57**
 y3 Timing 3.55 1.48 .15* .18** -.02 .05 .06 -.12 -.20**-.10 -.02 .15*
 y4 Profitability 2.62 1.22 .14* .09 .03 -.11 .00 -.12 -.03 -.01 .23** .22** .21**
 y5 Market 2.36 1.21 .01 .08 .03 .01 .01 -.21** -.07 -.06 .16** .09 .21** .51**
 share
 y6 Retention 3.35 0.88 .06 .06 .00 -.05 -.09 .24** .32** .28** .04 .10 -.14* .23** .12
 y7 Satisfaction 3.18 0.90 .15* .22** .04 -.08 -.12 .08 .05 .13* .26** .17** .04 .51** .41** .59**
 * p < .05
 **p < .01
 ceived economic performance (performance), and
 overall satisfaction (satisfaction).
 Respondents recorded their responses to items
 on a five-point Likert scale with coding ranging
 from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), ex-
 cept for the equity ownership and performance
 variables. The equity ownership variable was mea-
 sured on an interval scale. The three performance
 variables were measured with items on a five-point
 Likert scale, with coding ranging from 1 (poor) to 5
 (extremely good). Table 1 shows the correlations
 among measured variables. The survey items and
 the scaling used to measure these constructs are
 summarized in the Appendix.5
 Analysis
 The analysis was conducted using LISREL VIII.
 LISREL is used to estimate the structural coeffi-
 cients that reflect relationships among estimates of
 theoretic constructs rather than among observable
 variables themselves or simple linear composites of
 observables. Figure 1 provides the coefficients and
 t-values for the paths between latent variables. The
 associated parameter estimates, standard devia-
 5 The coefficient alphas of importance, infrastructure,
 technology, and performance were .71, .74, .80, and .73,
 respectively, all of which exceeded the .70 level recom-
 mended by Nunnally (1978). We cannot present the in-
 ternal consistency coefficients of the remaining vari-
 ables, timing, retention, satisfaction, and control. The
 first three are single-item variables, and control includes
 the item measured on a continuous scale (x4).
 tions, and t-values are reported in Table 2, and the
 total effects of the exogenous and prior endogenous
 constructs are summarized in Table 3. Table 4 pro-
 vides a summary of the direct and indirect effects of
 the exogenous and prior endogenous constructs.
 RESULTS
 We tested the proposed hypotheses using gener-
 alized least square (GLS) techniques.
 First, we examined the overall fit of the model to
 the data. The chi-square statistic indicates whether
 the variance-covariance matrix of observables repro-
 duced by the model is not equal to the observed
 variance-covariance matrix. Our model had an ade-
 quate fit to the data, as was indicated by an insignif-
 icant chi-square value of 73.5 (df = 68, p = .30). The
 overall chi-square goodness-of-fit test with a p-value
 actually exceeding .10 indicated that the model was
 well specified (Keats & Hitt, 1988). In addition, the
 adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI = .92), compar-
 ative fit index (CFI = .98), relative fit index (RFI =
 .76), root-mean-square residual (RMSR = .08), and
 root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA =
 .04) were all within acceptable ranges. In addition,
 since the rank conditions of the model (Bollen, 1989)
 were satisfactory, we concluded that there were no
 critical identification problems in the model.
 Table 2 shows that the measurement model looks
 good, with all the items significantly associated
 with the corresponding latent variables at the .01
 level. The goodness-of-fit statistics for the struc-
 tural equations indicate very good fit for satisfac-
 tion and degree of resource commitment to tech-
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 FIGURE 1
 Paths between Latent Variablesa
 X83
 a Coefficient values appear above t-values (p < .01).
 y43
 .61
 4.10**
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 TABLE 2
 LISREL Results: Measurement Modela
 Item Variable Parameter Estimates s.d. t
 Role Importance 1
 Definition Importance k2l(x) 1.18 .13 9.06**
 Post Control 1
 Equity Control A42(x) -0.54 .22 -2.50**
 Chairman Control A52(x) -0.89 .09 -9.09**
 Protection Infrastructure 1
 Recruit Infrastructure A73(x) 1.12 .17 6.59**
 Distribution Infrastructure A83(x) 0.91 .15 6.29**
 Technology Technology 1
 Engineer Technology X21(y) 0.73 .08 8.88**
 Timing Timing 1
 Profitability Performance 1
 Market share Performance X53(y) 0.76 .11 7.10**
 Retention Retention 1
 Satisfaction Satisfaction 1
 a Estimates are for the effects of items on variables.
 nology transfer, with adjusted multiple squared
 correlation coefficients (R2s) of over .50. There was
 good fit for timing of entry and perceived economic
 performance (adjusted R2s = .27 and .25). The em-
 ployee retention equation was only a fair fit (adjust-
 ed R2 = .18).
 Consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2, the results
 of the analysis suggested that both the degree of
 resource commitment to technology transfer (/31 =
 .23, t = 3.59) and the timing of entry (/32 = .25, t =
 3.91) had a significant and positive direct impact
 on performance. As shown in Table 4, technology
 had a significant and positive indirect impact on
 satisfaction. Neither technology nor timing was sig-
 nificantly associated with retention.
 The results also suggested that the three exoge-
 nous variables, strategic importance, a Japanese
 parent's control, and supporting infrastructure, sig-
 nificantly influenced technology transfer. Consis-
 tent with Hypotheses 3 and 4, strategic importance
 had a significant and positive impact on both tech-
 nology (y11 = .82, t = 7.08) and timing (y21 = .52,
 t = 4.08). As predicted by Hypotheses 5 and 6, the
 extent of Japanese parent control had a signifi-
 cantly positive impact on technology (Y12 = .25, t =
 2.96) and had a significant and negative impact on
 timing (722 = -.43, t = -3.94).
 Contradicting Hypotheses 7 and 8, the availabil-
 ity of supporting infrastructure had a significant
 and negative impact on timing (Y23 = -.53, t =
 -3.86) and had no significant impact on technol-
 ogy (Y13 - .07, t = 0.66). These results suggest that
 the Japanese firms were more likely to be early
 movers when investing in areas where infrastruc-
 ture (for instance, local distribution networks, local
 human capital, and legal systems for property right
 protection) were less developed, and they chose to
 be technology leaders or followers, irrespective of
 the availability of sophisticated supporting infra-
 structure.
 The results in Table 4 show that strategic impor-
 tance had both direct and indirect impacts on per-
 ceived economic performance and overall satisfac-
 tion. The extent of a Japanese parent's control was
 not significantly and indirectly associated with ei-
 ther performance or satisfaction. The availability of
 supporting infrastructure was the only variable that
 was significantly and positively associated with
 employee retention likelihood (Y43 = .61, t = 4.10)
 and had a significant and positive indirect impact
 on satisfaction.
 As expected, retention was significantly and pos-
 itively associated with performance (934 = .26, t =
 3.91). Also, both retention (354 = .45, t = 7.76) and
 performance (f53 = .71, t = 6.82) were significantly
 and positively associated with satisfaction. As Ta-
 ble 4 shows, the two exogenous variables, impor-
 tance and infrastructure, had a significant and pos-
 itive indirect impact on satisfaction.
 The results are suggestive even beyond the hy-
 pothesis tests. Table 4 shows the standardized co-
 efficients and the indirect effects of both exogenous
 and endogenous variables on the intermediate vari-
 ables-technology and timing-as well as on the
 three results variables: performance, retention, and
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 TABLE 3
 LISREL Results by Generalized Least Squares
 Analysisa
 Tech- Per- Satis-
 nology Timing formance Retention faction
 Variable 12 3 q4 q5
 711 721
 Importance .82 .52
 (.12) (.13)
 7.08 4.08
 Y12 Y22
 Control .25 -.43
 ~2 (.08) (.11)
 2.96 -3.94
 713 Y23 Y43
 Infrastructure .07 -.53 .61
 ~3 (.11) (.14) (.15)
 0.66 -3.86 4.10
 131 141
 Technology .23 .01
 Thi (.06) (.07)
 3.59 0.25
 132 142
 Timing .25 -.07
 /2 (.06) (.07)
 3.91 -1.04
 153
 Performance .71
 T13 (.10)
 6.82
 134 154
 Retention .26 .45
 T14 (.06) (.05)
 3.91 7.76
 Adjusted R2 .53 .25 .27 .18 .63
 a N - 220; X2 = 73.51, df = 68, p = .30; adjusted good-of-fit
 index = .92; comparative fit index = .98; relative fit index = .76;
 root-mean-square residual = .07; root-mean-square error of ap-
 proximation = .05. Values in upper rows are standardized esti-
 mates. Values in middle rows are standard deviations. Values in
 lower rows are t's.
 satisfaction.6 Consider first the two intermediate
 variables, technology and timing. For technology,
 importance is about ten times as predictive as in-
 frastructure (.82 vs. .07). In sharp contrast, timing
 has a more equal balance between the impacts of
 6 The standardized coefficients may be viewed as the
 typical change or variation in a dependent variable in-
 duced by or associated with a typical variation in the
 independent variable (Goldberger, 1964). As noted in
 Goldberger, "typical" is calibrated by the sample stan-
 dard deviation for each variable. Thus, if the standard-
 ized coefficient of variable A is twice the standardized
 coefficient of variable B when both are predictors in an
 equation for C, the interpretation would be that variable
 A is twice as important as variable B in accounting for
 importance (.52), control (-.43), and infrastructure
 (-.53), although there is the same ordering of these
 variables, with infrastructure having the most im-
 portant impact and control the least. Thus, facili-
 tating timing requires a more extensive domain of
 actions than does facilitating technology.
 Turning to the three results variables, we show in
 Table 4 that four of the variables have a significant
 impact on performance. The standardized coeffi-
 cients indicate that importance (.31) is the most
 important predictor of performance, followed by
 retention (.26), technology (.24), and timing (.23).
 Interestingly, technology and timing have almost
 equal power to predict performance (.24 and .23).
 For retention, which had by far the poorest fit of the
 five equations, only infrastructure is significant,
 but its level (.65) indicates fairly substantial im-
 pact. Finally, for satisfaction, all variables are sig-
 nificant, with performance (.71) and retention (.64)
 having stronger impacts than the other variables.
 DISCUSSION
 The purpose of this study was to investigate de-
 terminants and performance consequences of for-
 eign market entry strategy in one of the major
 emerging economic regions-China. Consistent
 with our prediction, the results show that the
 greater the resource commitment to technology
 transfer, and the faster the entry, the more likely it
 was that JVs attained superior economic perfor-
 mance. Our evidence also shows that the timing of
 entry and resource commitment to technology
 transfer had almost equal power to predict perfor-
 mance.
 The finding that technology leaders and early
 movers tended to attain superior economic perfor-
 mance in China relative to technology followers
 and late movers implies that a wait-and-see ap-
 proach may not always be a better strategy in
 emerging economic regions. This idea suggests an
 interesting conceptual twist in foreign firms' inter-
 national expansion strategies. In previous studies
 of internationalization, researchers have tended to
 treat uncertainties in foreign markets as given and
 have viewed a firm's international expansion as
 either an adaptive or a learning process in unfamil-
 iar local environments (Chang, 1995; Johanson &
 Vahlne, 1977, 1990). This perspective suggests that
 firms investing in a country with a greater uncer-
 tainty tend to perceive a higher level of investment
 risk and, thus, engage in less resource commitment
 in foreign direct investment (Johanson & Vahlne,
 1977, 1990). However, the results of the present
 study suggest that the Japanese firms tended to
 variation in variable C.
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 TABLE 4
 Effects of Exogenous and Prior Endogenous Constructsa
 Technology Timing Performance Retention Satisfaction
 11 12 7X3 314 15
 Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
 Variable Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect
 Importance .82 .82 .52 .52 .31 .31 -.02 -.02 .21 .21
 (i 7.08 7.08 4.08 4.08 4.22 4.22 -0.38 -0.38 3.11 3.11
 Control .25 .25 -.43 -.43 -.04 -.04 .04 .04 -.01 -.01
 (2 2.96 2.96 -3.94 -3.94 -0.85 -0.85 0.93 0.93 -0.27 -0.27
 Infrastructure .07 .07 -.53 -.53 .06 .06 .61 .04 .65 .33 .33
 63 0.66 0.66 -3.86 -3.86 0.80 0.80 4.10 1.03 4.58 3.46 3.46
 Technology .23 .01 .24 .02 .02 .18 .18
 T 1 3.59 0.25 3.48 0.25 0.25 2.62 2.62
 Timing .25 -.02 .23 -.08 -.08 .13 .13
 T?2 3.91 -0.99 3.45 -1.04 -1.04 1.92 1.92
 Performance .71 .71
 1T3 6.82 6.82
 Retention .26 .26 .45 .19 .64
 Tq4 3.91 3.91 7.76 3.51 11.00
 a Values in upper rows are standardized effects. Values in lower rows are t's.
 advantages in China. This evidence suggests that
 the level of perceived uncertainty in a local market
 may not always be a major constraint for arket
 entry into an emerging economic region.
 Our study provides several i plications con-
 cerning the factors influencing foreign firms' entry
 strategies in emerging economies. First, our evi-
 dence suggests that the firms that viewed entry into
 China as strategically important were more likely to
 be both technology leaders and early movers and in
 turn attained superior perceived economic perfor-
 mance. One interpretation of this finding is that a
 foreign firm's strong commitment to the success of
 its investment may be critical for successful entry
 into China. Abramson and Ai (1996) found that
 North American firms with positive (negative) ex-
 pectations about doing business in China were
 much more likely to attain successful (unsuccess-
 ful) performance. In a network-based society like
 China, the key to successful entry may be to de-
 velop strong personal connections (or guanxi) with
 key local players and gain recognition from the
 local business community. In order to do so, for-
 eign firms should emphasize the importance of the
 investment to the local community and show their
 commitment to the success of the investment.
 Second, our evidence suggests that the extent of a
 foreign firm's control over a JV was negatively as-
 sociated with early entry, yet was positively asso-
 ciated with the degree of resource commitment to
 technology transfer. This pattern implies that for-
 eign firms' decisions regarding the choice of con-
 trol mode in foreign investment in emerging eco-
 nomic regions may be based on an interplay
 between th  potential risks of interpartner spillover
 ithin a JV and the potential contributions fro
 local JV partn rs with resp ct to local market ac-
 cess. The risks increase the firms' incentives to
 secure dominant control over their JV part ers, and
 the contributions motivate the firms to share con-
 trol with local partners. One important implication
 of this evidence is that foreign firms strictly pursu-
 ing dominant control over their local JV partners
 may fail to gain their local partners' assistance for
 entry into a local market and, hence, may miss the
 chance to gain early mover advantages. As previous
 studies have suggested, local partners' contribu-
 tions in market access are often very critical for
 successful JV performance in emerging economic
 regions (Beamish, 1985, 1993; Makino & Delios,
 1996). The key issue that a foreign firm wishing to
 gain early mover advantages should consider is not
 securing dominant control within a JV but gaining
 sufficient contributions from the partners. To gain
 further understanding of entry strategy, therefore,
 researchers conducting future studies should ex-
 amine how resource commitment and timing of
 entry would be influenced by the choice of entry
 mode and alliance partners.
 Third, our findings suggest that the availability of
 sophisticated infrastructure may not be critical for a
 foreign firm to be an early mover in an emerging
 economic region. Contrary to our prediction, the re-
 sults of our analysis suggested that the availability of
 supporting infrastructure was negatively associated
 with early entry and had no impact on the resource
 2000  479
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 commitment to technology transfer. One possible rea-
 son for this finding is that it may be too late for a firm
 to become an early mover by the time infrastructure
 like distribution networks is ready. Some successful
 early movers have actually developed the necessary
 infrastructure by themselves and built leading market
 positions in local marketplaces. Honda's successful
 investment strategy in the U.S. motorcycle industry
 in the late 1950s is a good example. At that time, the
 U.S. motorcycle industry was dominated by Harley-
 Davidson, and Honda found no access to established
 local distribution networks for their smaller motorcy-
 cles. Honda's management team nonetheless targeted
 a large, untapped, small-motorcycle segment of the
 market and eventually developed its own distribu-
 tion networks across the nation (Pascale, 1984). This
 example suggests that foreign firms have a chance to
 succeed in gaining early mover advantages even in
 the absence of sufficient supporting infrastructure in
 a target local market. As this example implies, a fu-
 ture study should examine the possibility that, in the
 absence of established infrastructure, successful early
 movers develop it themselves.
 Limitations
 The limitations of this study are threefold. First,
 we did not preclude from the analysis the survi-
 vor bias for the performance consequences of
 technology transfer. The survivor bias is a critical
 issue in studies of international business in gen-
 eral and those of entry timing in particular
 (Golder & Tellis, 1993; Mascarenhas, 1992a,
 1992b; Mitchell, 1989). Given that many early
 movers in China might be terminated or taken
 over owing to poor performance in the early
 stages of local market development, the sample
 we used in the analysis may contain only finan-
 cially successful JVs. Researchers conducting a
 future study should investigate the performance
 of market entry strategy controlling for both entry
 timing and the survival of foreign subsidiaries in
 emerging economic regions.
 Second, our study is limited in the scope of its
 research design. Given the diversity among emerg-
 ing economic regions, researchers should widen
 the scope of the study of strategies in these regions
 to control for country-specific factors that could
 influence firms' entry strategies. The present study,
 however, focused only on a single host country,
 China, and a single home country, Japan. The ques-
 tion of whether the findings of the present study are
 generalizable to other emerging economies or other
 home countries of entrants remains unanswered.
 More studies should be conducted to examine the
 strategy into different emerging regions and differ-
 ent home country contexts.
 Finally, we used survey information from the
 Chinese recipients of the transfers of technological
 knowledge and did not include the valuation of the
 transfers from the transferrers' (the Japanese par-
 ents') perspective. Some may argue that the Japa-
 nese managers should have been the respondents,
 as the Chinese managers may have had little a
 priori understanding of transferred technology, es-
 pecially when the technology had tacit compo-
 nents. In contrast, one could make the case that the
 Chinese managers are the relevant actors in tech-
 nology transfer and thereby should be the respon-
 dents. The Chinese managers are indeed the ones
 who are reacting and whose satisfaction, retention,
 and perhaps even performance are likely to be
 impacted.
 Perhaps neither of the two arguments is right, as
 they may reflect distinct perspectives. After all,
 neither the magnitude nor the direction of potential
 biases in the valuation of transferred technology is
 known. In this study, we took the recipient's per-
 spective because we believed that the valuation of a
 transferred technology can be better assessed by the
 recipients who are responsible for the success or
 failure of commercializing the technology in a local
 marketplace.
 Most previous studies of cross-border knowledge
 transfer have focused exclusively on either the
 transferrer's perspective (e.g., Kogut & Zander,
 1993) or the recipient's perspective (e.g., Lyles &
 Salk, 1996). Szulanski (1996) "triangulated" the
 perceptions of transferrers, recipients, and external
 observers of transfers to validate findings. But he
 did not examine how the perceptions of these dif-
 ferent parties would differ. A future study might
 extend this line of research and examine whether
 and when the same results are obtained from dif-
 ferent perspectives.
 Conclusion
 The present study examined determinants and
 performance of foreign market entry strategy in
 China. The study identified factors influencing
 market entry strategy and found significant associ-
 ations between the perceived economic perfor-
 mance of a joint venture and two characteristics,
 the degree of resource commitment to technology
 transfer and the timing of entry.
 Although an increasing number of studies have
 investigated the characteristics and formation of
 foreign investment in China, most studies have
 used publicly available data or survey data from
 determinants and performance of foreign entry
 480  June
 relatively small samples, and few of the existing
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Tue, 12 Jun 2018 05:09:17 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Isobe, Makino, and Montgomery
 studies have examined the performance conse-
 quences of investment at the subsidiary level. The
 present study is one of the few large-sample studies
 that have examined the performance consequences
 of the market entry strategies of foreign (Japanese)
 firms in China.
 Finally, on a methodological note, this study as-
 sessed the identification of the system of equations
 (not a widespread, yet an important, practice in
 management, marketing, and strategy applications
 of LISREL) to safeguard the interpretation of the
 findings. It also illustrates how the calibration of a
 model clarifies the relative importance of various
 input variables. This process adds specificity and
 insight to the important, albeit limited, testing of
 hypotheses.
 REFERENCES
 Abramson, N. R., & Ai, J. X. 1996. You get what you
 expect in China. Business Quarterly, 61(2): 36-44.
 Anderson, E. 1990. Two firms, one frontier: On assessing
 joint venture performance. Sloan Management Re-
 view, 31(2): 19-30.
 Anderson, E., & Gatignon, H. 1986. Modes of foreign entry:
 A transaction cost analysis and propositions. Journal
 of International Business Studies, 17(3): 1-26.
 Barney, J. B. 1991. Firm resources and sustained compet-
 itive advantage. Journal of Management, 17: 99-
 120.
 Beamish, P. W. 1985. The characteristics of joint ventures
 in developed and developing countries. Columbia
 Journal of World Business, 20(3): 13-20.
 Beamish, P. W. 1993. The characteristics of joint ventures
 in the People's Republic of China. Journal of Inter-
 national Marketing, 1(2): 29-48.
 Beamish, P. W., Delios, A., & Lecraw, D. J. 1997. Japa-
 nese multinationals in the global economy. Chel-
 tenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.
 Bollen, K. A. 1989. Structural equations with latent
 variables. New York: Wiley.
 Carpenter, G. S., & Nakamoto, K. 1989. Consumer prefer-
 ence formation and pioneering advantage. Journal of
 Marketing Research, 26: 285-298.
 Caves, R. E. 1971. International corporations: The indus-
 trial economics of foreign investment. Economica,
 38(149): 1-27.
 Caves, R. E. 1996. Multinational enterprise and eco-
 nomic analysis (2nd ed.). New York: Cambridge
 University Press.
 Chang, S. J. 1995. International expansion strategy of
 Japanese firms: Capability building through sequen-
 tial entry. Academy of Management Journal, 38:
 383-407.
 China: The introduction of color TV. In P. W.
 Beamish, A. Morrison, P. M. Rosenzweig, & A. C.
 Inkpen (Eds.), International management (4th ed.):
 Forthcoming. Boston: Irwin.
 Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. 1990. Absorptive capacity:
 A new perspective on learning and innovation. Ad-
 ministrative Science Quarterly, 35: 128-152.
 Davidson, W. H., & McFetridge, D. G. 1985. Key charac-
 teristics in the choice of internal technology transfer.
 Journal of International Business Studies, 16(2):
 5-21.
 Ding, D. Z. 1997. Control, conflict, and performance: A
 study of U.S.-Chinese joint ventures. Journal of In-
 ternational Marketing, 5(3): 31-45.
 Dunning, J. H. 1980. Toward an eclectic theory of inter-
 national production: Some empirical tests. Journal
 of International Business Studies, 11(1): 9-31.
 Geringer, J. M., & Hebert, L. 1991. Measuring perfor-
 mance of international joint ventures. Journal of
 International Business Studies, 22(2): 249-264.
 Ghoshal, S., & Bartlett, C. A. 1990. The multinational
 corporation as an interorganizational network.
 Academy of Management Review, 15: 603-625.
 Goldberger, A. S. 1964. Econometric theory. New York:
 Wiley.
 Golder, P. N., & Tellis, G. J. 1993. Pioneer advantage:
 Marketing logic or marketing legend? Journal of
 Marketing Research. 30: 158-170.
 Gulati, R. 1998. Alliances and networks. Strategic Man-
 agement Journal, 19: 293-317.
 Hamel, G. 1991. Competition for competence and inter-
 partner learning within international strategic alli-
 ances. Strategic Management Journal, 12(summer
 special issue): 83-103.
 Hamel, G., Doz, Y. L., & Prahalad, C. K. 1989. Collaborate
 with your competitors-and win. Harvard Business
 Review, 67(1): 133-139.
 Hymer, S. H. 1976. The international operations of na-
 tional firms: A study of direct foreign investment.
 Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
 Inkpen, A. C., & Beamish, P. W. 1997. Knowledge, bar-
 gaining power, and the instability of international
 joint ventures. Academy of Management Review,
 22: 177-202.
 Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J. E. 1977. The internationaliza-
 tion process of the firm-A model of knowledge
 development and increasing foreign market commit-
 ments. Journal of International Business Studies,
 8(1): 23-32.
 Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J. E. 1990. The mechanism of
 internationalization. International Marketing Re-
 view, 7(4): 11-24.
 Keats, B. W., & Hitt, M. A. 1988. A causal model of
 Choi, C. B., Beamish, P. W., & Sharp, D. 2000. Samsung
 2000  481
 linkages among environmental dimension, macro or-
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Tue, 12 Jun 2018 05:09:17 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Academy of Management Journal
 ganizational characteristics, and performance. Acad-
 emy of Management Journal, 31: 570-598.
 Kerin, R. A., Varadarajan, P. R., & Peterson, R. A. 1992.
 First-mover advantage: A synthesis, conceptual
 framework, and research propositions. Journal of
 Marketing, 56(4): 33-52.
 Khanna, T., Gulati, R., & Nohria, N. 1998. The dynamics
 of learning alliances: Competition, cooperation, and
 relative scope. Strategic Management Journal, 19:
 193-210.
 Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. 1997. Why focused strategies
 may be wrong for emerging markets. Harvard Busi-
 ness Review, 75(4): 41-51.
 Kogut, B. 1988. Joint ventures: Theoretical and empirical
 perspectives. Strategic Management Journal, 9:
 319-332.
 Kogut, B. 1989. The stability of joint ventures: Reciproc-
 ity and competitive rivalry. Journal of Industrial
 Economics, 38: 183-198.
 Kogut, B., & Chang, S. J. 1996. Platform investments and
 volatile exchange rates: Direct investment in the U.S.
 by Japanese electronic companies. Review of Eco-
 nomics and Statistics, 78: 221-231.
 Kogut, B., & Zander, U. 1992. Knowledge of the firm,
 combinative capabilities, and the replication of tech-
 nology. Organization Science, 3: 383-397.
 Kogut, B., & Zander, U. 1993. Knowledge of the firm and
 the evolutionary theory of the multinational corpo-
 ration. Journal of International Business Studies,
 24: 625-645.
 Kumar, K. 1981. Introduction. In K. Kumar & M. G.
 McLeod (Eds.), Multinationals from developing
 countries: xv-xxv. Lexington, MA: Heath.
 Larson, A. 1992. Network dyads in entrepreneurial set-
 tings: A study of the governance of exchange rela-
 tionships. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37:
 76-104.
 Lecraw, D. J. 1981. Internationalization of firms from
 LDCs: Evidence from the ASEAN Region. In K. Ku-
 mar & M. G. McLeod (Eds.), Multinationals from
 developing countries: 37-51. Lexington, MA:
 Heath.
 Lecraw, D. J. 1993. Outward direct investment by Indo-
 nesian firms: Motivation and effects. Journal of In-
 ternational Business Studies, 24: 589-600.
 Levitt, B., & March, J. G. 1988. Organizational learning. In
 W. R. Scott (Ed.), Annual review of sociology, vol.
 14: 319-340. Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews.
 Lieberman, M. B., & Montgomery, D. B. 1988. First-mover
 advantages. Strategic Management Journal, 9(sum-
 mer special issue): 41-58.
 Lieberman, M. B., & Montgomery, D. B. 1998. First-mover
 (dis)advantages: Retrospective and link with the re-
 source-based view. Strategic Management Journal,
 Luo, Y. 1998. Timing of investment and international
 performance in China. Journal of International
 Business Studies, 29: 391-408.
 Luo, Y., & Peng, M. W. 1998. First mover advantages in
 investing in transitional economies. Thunderbird
 International Business Review, 40(2): 141-163.
 Lyles, M. A., & Salk, J. E. 1996. Knowledge acquisition
 from foreign parents in international joint ventures:
 An empirical examination in the Hungarian context.
 Journal of International Business Studies, 27: 877-
 903.
 Makino, S., & Beamish, P. W. 1999. Matching strategy
 with the choice of joint venture ownership structure.
 Academy of Management Executive, 12(4): 17-27.
 Makino, S., & Delios, A. 1996. Local knowledge transfer
 and performance: Implications for alliance forma-
 tion in Asia. Journal of International Business
 Studies, 27: 905-927.
 Mascarenhas, B. 1992a. First-mover effects in multiple
 dynamic markets. Strategic Management Journal,
 13: 237-243.
 Mascarenhas, B. 1992b. Order of entry and performance
 in international markets. Strategic Management
 Journal, 13: 499-510.
 Mascarenhas, B. 1997. The order and size of entry into
 international markets. Journal of Business Ventur-
 ing, 12: 287-299.
 Mishra, C. S., & Gobeli, D. H. 1998. Managerial incen-
 tives, internalization, and market valuation of mul-
 tinational firms. Journal of International Business
 Studies, 29: 583-598.
 Mitchell, W. 1989. Whether and when? Probability and
 timing of incumbents' entry into emerging industrial
 subfields. Administrative Science Quarterly, 34:
 208-230.
 Mitchell, W. 1991. Dual clocks: Entry order influences on
 incumbent and newcomer market share and survival
 when specialized assets retain their value. Strategic
 Management Journal, 12: 85-100.
 Mitchell, W., Shaver, J. M., & Yeung, B. 1994. Foreign
 entrant survival and foreign market share: Canadian
 companies' experience in United States medical sec-
 tor markets. Strategic Management Journal, 15:
 555-567.
 Mitsubishi Research Institute. 1995. Japanese business
 in China. Tokyo: Sohsoh-sha.
 Morck, R., & Yeung, B. 1992. Internalization: An event
 study test. Journal of International Economics, 33:
 41-56.
 Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. 1982. An evolutionary
 theory of economic change. Cambridge, MA: Har-
 vard University Press.
 Nunnally, J. C. 1978. Psychometric theory (2nd ed.).
 New York: McGraw-Hill.
 482  June
 19: 1111-1125.
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Tue, 12 Jun 2018 05:09:17 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Isobe, Makino, and Montgomery
 Pan, Y., & Chi, P. S. K. 1999. Financial performance and
 survival of multinational corporations in China.
 Strategic Management Journal, 20: 359-374.
 Pan, Y., Li, S., & Tse, D. K. 1999. The impact of order of
 entry and mode of market entry on profitability and
 market share. Journal of International Business
 Studies, 30: 81-104.
 Park, S. H., & Russo, M. F. 1996. When competition eclipses
 cooperation: An event history analysis of joint venture
 failure. Management Science, 42: 875-890.
 Parkhe, A. 1993. Strategic alliance structuring: A game
 theoretic and transaction cost examination of inter-
 firm cooperation. Academy of Management Jour-
 nal, 36: 794-829.
 Pascale, R. T. 1984. Perspectives on strategy: The real
 story behind Honda's success. California Manage-
 ment Review, 26(3): 47-72.
 Podsakoff, P. M., & Organ, D. W. 1986. Self-reports in
 organizational research: Problems and prospects.
 Journal of Management, 12: 531-544.
 Rivoli, P., & Salorio, E. 1996. Foreign direct investment
 and investment under uncertainty. Journal of Inter-
 national Business Studies, 27: 335-357.
 Shan, W., Walker, G., & Kogut, B. 1994. Interfirm coop-
 eration and startup innovation in the biotechnology
 industry. Strategic Management Journal, 57: 387-
 394.
 Shaver, J. M., Mitchell, W., & Yeung, B. 1997. The effect
 of own-firm and other-firm experience on foreign
 direct investment survival in the United States,
 1987-97. Strategic Management Journal, 18: 811-
 824.
 Szulanski, G. 1996. Exploring internal stickiness: Imped-
 iments to the transfer of best practice within the
 firm. Strategic Management Journal, 17(winter
 special issue): 27-43.
 Szymanski, D. M., Troy, L. C., & Bharadwaj, S. G. 1995.
 Order of entry and business performance: An empir-
 ical synthesis and reexamination. Journal of Mar-
 keting, 59(4): 17-33.
 Teece, D. J. 1977. Technology transfer by multinational
 firms: The resource cost of transferring technological
 know-how. Economic Journal, 87: 242-261.
 Teece, D. J. 1986. Profiting from technological innova-
 tion: Implications for integration, collaboration, li-
 censing and public policy. Research Policy, 15:
 285-305.
 Tegarden, L. F., Hatfield, D. E., & Echols, A. E. 1999.
 Doomed from the start: What is the value of selecting
 a future dominant design? Strategic Management
 Journal, 20: 495-518.
 Toyo Keizai. 1997. Kaigai shinshutsu kigyo soran 1997:
 Kaisha-betsu [Directory of overseas affiliates 1997: By
 Tushman, M. L., & Anderson, P. 1986. Technological
 discontinuities and organizational environments.
 Administrative Science Quarterly, 31: 439-465.
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
 1997. World investment report: Investment, trade
 and international policy agreements. New York:
 United Nations.
 von Hippel, E. 1988. The sources of innovation. New
 York: Oxford University Press.
 Wells, L. T. 1981. Foreign investors from the third world.
 In K. Kumar & M. G. McLeod (Eds.), Multinationals
 from developing countries: 23-36. Lexington, MA:
 Heath.
 Wells, L. T. 1983. Third world multinationals: The rise
 of foreign investment form developing countries.
 Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
 Yan, R. 1998. Short-term results: The litmus test for
 success in China. Harvard Business Review,
 76(5): 61-69.
 APPENDIX
 Survey Items Used to Measure Constructs
 and Scaling
 Items with verbal anchors in parentheses had 1-5 re-
 sponse scales.
 Latent Exogenous Variables
 81. Strategic importance
 xl, role: The JV plays a significant role to the Japa-
 nese parent's overall global strategy (very
 unlikely-very likely)
 x2, definition: The role that the JV is expected to
 play for the Japanese parent is clearly defined
 (not clearly defined-clearly defined)
 82. The extent of a Japanese parent's control
 x3, post: The Japanese expatriates occupy signifi-
 cant management posts in the JV (very un-
 likely-very likely)
 x4, equity: The extent of equity share owned by the
 Chinese partner (0-100%)
 x5, chairman: The chairman of the JV is a Chinese
 (no, 0; 1, yes)
 83. Availability of supporting infrastructure
 x6, protection: The legal protection of intellectual
 property rights, patented technology
 and trademark is sufficient (not suf-
 ficient-very sufficient)
 x7, recruit: It is easy to recruit skilled local human
 resources (very difficult-very easy)
 x8, infrastructure: Local distribution network and
 infrastructure are well devel-
 oped (not developed-very well
 parent firm]. Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimposha.
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 Latent Endogenous Variables
 /1l. The resource commitment to technology transfer
 yl, technology: The Japanese parent has provided
 the JV with updated technology
 and know-how (very unlikely-very
 likely)
 y2, engineer: The Japanese parent has sent skilled
 engineers and product managers to
 the JV (very unlikely-very likely)
 7)2. Timing of entry
 y3, timing: The Japanese parent's entry into the
 Chinese market through the JV is much
 earlier (or later) than its rivals (much
 later-much earlier)
 -13. Perceived economic performance
 y4, profitability: Perceived profitability of the JV
 (very unsatisfactory-very satisfac-
 tory)
 y5, market share: Perceived brand loyalty and mar-
 ket share of the JV (very unsatis-
 factory-very satisfactory)
 714. Employee retention rate
 y6, retention: The subjective assessment of the re-
 tention rate of local employees (very
 low-very high)
 r75. Overall satisfaction
 y7, satisfaction: The subjective assessment of over-
 all performance of the JV (very un-
 satisfactory-very satisfactory)
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